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Abstract
Natural hazards have the capability to affect technological installations, triggering multiple
failures and putting the population and the surrounding environment at risk. Global climate
change introduces an additional and not negligible element of uncertainty to the vulnerability
quantification, threatening to intensify (both in terms of frequency and severity) the occurrence
of extreme climate events. Sea level extremes and extreme coastal high waters are expected to
change in the future as a result of both changes in atmospheric storminess and mean sea level
rise, as well as extreme precipitation events. These trends clearly suggest a parallel increase
in the risks affecting technological installations and the subsequent need for mitigation mea-
sures to enhance the reliability of existing systems and to improve the design standards of new
facilities. In spite of this situation, the scientific research in this field lacks robust and reliable
tools for this kind of assessment, often relying on the adoption of oversimplified models or
strong assumptions, which affect the credibility of the results. The main purpose of this study
is to provide a novel and general model for the evaluation of the risk of exposure of spent
nuclear fuel stored in a facility subject to flood hazard, investigating the potential and limi-
tations of Bayesian networks (BNs) in this field. The network aims to model the interaction
*s.tolo@liverpool.ac.uk
10
between extreme weather conditions and the technological installation, as well as the prop-
agation of failures within the system itself, taking into account the dependencies among the
different components and the occurrence of human error. A real-world application concerning
the nuclear power station of Sizewell B in East Anglia, in the United Kingdom, is extensively
described, together with the models and data set used. Results are presented for three different
time scenarios in which climate change projections have been adopted to estimate future risks.
1 Introduction
The occurrence of technological disasters triggered by natural hazards (generally referred to as
Natech events) has progressively raised concerns in the scientific community and increased the
awareness of public opinion about the vulnerability of technological installations and infrastruc-
tures to extreme weather conditions. In addition, global climate change introduces an additional
and not negligible element of uncertainty to the overall risk, threatening to intensify (both in terms
of frequency and severity) the occurrence of extreme climate events. Evidence of a substantial
increase in heavy precipitation events has been described in Trenberth et al. [68]. The same
study stated that "it is likely that there have been increases in the number of heavy precipitation
events (e.g., 95th percentile) within many land regions, even in those where there has been a re-
duction in total precipitation amount, consistent with a warming climate, and observed significant
increasing amounts of water vapour in the atmosphere. Increases have also been reported for rarer
precipitation events (1 in 50-year return period). "This globally observed change in daily winter
precipitation in the period 1901–2000 has been confirmed by more detailed country-based studies,
such as Maraun et al. [44] in the United Kingdom, and appears to be consistent with the expected
response to anthropogenic forcing [61]. Coherent with the observed increasing trends over the
twentieth century, projected changes show that the frequency of heavy precipitation or proportion
of total precipitation from heavy precipitation would increase over most areas of the globe [68].
According to the U.K. Climate Projections (UKCP09), central estimates are for heavy-rain days
(rainfall greater than 25 mm) over most of the lowland United Kingdom to increase by a factor
of between 2 and 3.5 in winter, and 1 and 2 in summer by the 2080s, under the assumption of
a medium-emissions scenario [47]. Also, transient sea level extremes and extreme coastal high
waters are expected to change in the future as a result of both changes in atmospheric storminess
and mean sea level rise. Trends in extreme coastal high waters across the globe suggest that mean
sea level rise, rather than changes in storminess, largely contributes to the increase in sea level
extremes. Indeed, the rate of observed sea level rise appears to have increased from the 19th to the
20th centuries, with a mean sea level rising at an average rate of 1.7 (1.2–2.2) mm per year over the
20th century, 1.8 mm per year over 1961 to 2003, and at a rate of 3.1 (2.4–3.8) mm per year over
1993–2003 [8]. On the basis of this trend and observed trends in extreme coastal high-water levels,
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it is very likely that mean sea level rise will contribute to upward trends in the future [61]. Further-
more, despite the great uncertainty, various shortcomings associated with anemometer data, and
the inconsistency in anemometer and reanalysis trends in some regions [61], a few studies show
growing winter wind storm risk over Europe [56] [16] [17] and particularly an increasing trend in
extreme winds over northern Europe [57]. The combination of these factors (i.e., intensification in
terms of both frequency and severity of the occurrence of extreme wind and rain events, together
with sea level rise) increases the likelihood of flooding along shorelines, which are already expe-
riencing the adverse consequences of impacts such as increased coastal inundation, erosion, and
ecosystem losses.
Regardless of the regional variability of climate phenomena on a local scale, the impact of antic-
ipated climate-related changes on coasts are virtually certain to be overwhelmingly negative [52].
This growing hazard will directly affect a large amount of industrial facilities, which have long
been located along riverbeds or coastlines to facilitate the transport of materials and to provide
easy access to water for industrial processes and waste disposal. For instance, the majority of the
nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom are situated on the coast to ensure the availability
of cooling water; for the same reason, it is likely that new nuclear facilities will be built in coastal
areas. In light of this fact, without appropriate mitigation measures, the potential effects of climate
change could mean that these sites will become vulnerable to a greater risk of flooding than if they
were located inland [69]. At the same time, the dramatic increase of utilization of the coast regis-
tered in the twentieth century is virtually certain to continue through the 21st century: according
to projections, the coastal population could grow from 1.2 billion people (in 1990) to an amount
between 1.8 and 5.2 billion people by the 2080s, depending on assumptions about migration [52].
Such growth would contribute to widening the hazardous areas to include an ever-increasing num-
ber of communities and technological installations.
These trends clearly suggest a parallel increase of the risk of Natech events and the need for miti-
gation measures to enhance the reliability of existing systems and to improve the design standards
of new facilities. While the perception of the risk posed by Natech events appears to run paral-
lel to the growth of vulnerability, unfortunately the same cannot be said for the theoretical and
computational tools available to quantify these kinds of hazards. Not only is knowledge of the
interactions between natural events and technological failures still limited [39], but also the current
approaches are often based on the adoption of oversimplified models or strong assumptions, which
irrevocably affect the reliability of the results. In light of this, the relevance of Natech risk analysis
is widely recognized within the scientific community, and further research in this field strongly
recommended [14][63].
The reasons behind the unsatisfying results of research in this direction and the subsequent lack of
robust tools must be attributed to several bottlenecks, including the following:
• Geographical extent. Natural hazards have the ability to affect large geographical areas and
more technological installations simultaneously. Methods for the quantification of the risk
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have to take into account accident scenarios involving failures not only within the facility
under study, but also related to the infrastructures whose unavailability can increase the
hazard or lower the reliability of the system of interest. Moreover, the wide area of impact
of natural events can lead to the occurrence of simultaneous accidents in more facilities,
affecting the response and nullifying some mitigation measures. In other words, tools for
Natech risk analysis have to be able to model and quantify the risk of simultaneous failures
and the domino effect, considering the external environment that the system under study can
interact with in case an accident occurs.
• Low probability-high impact. Uncertainty, incompleteness, or lack of information available
are issues common to all engineering applications. This is all the more true in the case
of low-probability events that are hardly observable: empirical data are generally poor and
strongly uncertain, especially with regard to data sets specifically dedicated to Natech sce-
narios, which are relatively new (even nowadays, a centralized reporting of these events is
not provided) [14]. In addition, the randomness of natural events is itself a great source of
uncertainty. On the other hand, it is also extremely important to consider the so-called black
swan events, meaning unexpected and extremely improbable events of large magnitude and
consequence, regarding which very limited or no information is available. Hence, risk anal-
ysis has to rely on robust modelling of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty and on tools
able to deal with low probability values.
• Complex networks of dependencies. Technological installations are complex systems that
generally involve a great amount of components interacting directly or indirectly with each
other. This implies that the failure of each individual component can affect a more-or-less
wide range of others, potentially triggering a chain of events and leading to more serious
accidents [71]. It is then essential to be able to adequately reproduce these interconnections
in order to take into account all the possible simultaneous failure scenarios.
• Interdisciplinarity. The study of Natech events involves a wide variety of experts with dif-
ferent backgrounds (e.g., ranging from engineers to meteorologists to psychologists). The
strongly interdisciplinary character of these applications comes from the complex mecha-
nisms of interactions among different environments (e.g., the technological and the natural
ones), as well as the importance of taking into account aspects such as the effectiveness of the
human response in case of accidents or the probability of human failure. To include coher-
ently the contributions from so many diverse sectors of scientific knowledge, it is necessary
to adopt an intuitive framework in terms of both methodology and computational tools that
should act as a common ground that is easy to use and understand and far from the jargon
of the individual sectors involved. This would simplify the dialogue among experts of dif-
ferent languages promoting the close collaboration of scientists and engineers with industry
leaders and policy makers in an interdisciplinary effort to tackle the problem of Natech risk
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reduction and to effectively raise awareness of the risks among the public [39]. The use of a
collective language would indeed satisfy the largely recognized need to improve articulation
between organizations of different specializations and to promote risk communication and
public awareness [14].
Bayesian networks (BNs) meet the requirements highlighted here to a considerable extent [64].
They can be considered as the general case of more common methodologies such as fault tree anal-
ysis [26], with respect to which they offer several advantages, at both the modelling and analysis
levels. Several restrictive assumptions implicit in the fault tree methodology (e.g., the restriction
to Boolean logic) can be avoided, complex dependencies among components can be easily rep-
resented, uncertainty can be included in modelling, and both forward and backward analyses are
allowed [9].
For the reasons highlighted previously, BNs are considered to be promising tools in the field of
Natech risk assessment and have been adopted in the present study.
1.1 Motivation of the study
The attention to issues related to nuclear safety is obviously been high, particularly after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident. While most of these concerns are focused on
the vulnerability of the reactors themselves, less attention has been paid to the spent fuel facili-
ties [often referred to with the term pools in the United States or ponds in the United Kingdom,
and more generally with the acronym spent fuel pond/pool (SFP)], which have the potential to
be more vulnerable to failure than the reactor containment building. Furthermore, as recognized
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [13], even if the likelihood of a zirconium fire due to the
exposure of spent fuel is generally very low, the consequences of a similar event would be highly
significant. For these reasons, the study of the vulnerability of such installations to external events,
such as extreme weather conditions, becomes relevant in view of a more general and accurate risk
assessment of nuclear facilities. This kind of analysis implies the use of flexible models that are
able to simulate not only the complexity of the system under study, but also different scenarios. For
example, assessing the impact of natural hazards on technological installations, the climate change
effect on extreme weather hazards cannot be neglected. Furthermore, a complete evaluation of the
risk requires models that are suitable for long-term decision-making support, but also for real-time
risk assessment, in order to guide the decision makers even in the case of imminent danger. Finally,
as stated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [13], SFP risk assessment is complicated by lack
of data (e.g., on severe earthquake return frequencies, source term generation in the air environ-
ment, SFP design variability, and other factors), hence requiring approaches that can handle a high
degree of uncertainty.
In addition to testing the BN approach in a field not fully explored yet, such as Natech risk analysis,
this study aims to provide the first generic model for the quantification of the risk of exposure of the
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Figure 1: Example of an elementary BN
spent nuclear fuel stored in a fuel pond. Moreover, the model is designed to meet the requirement
of flexibility mentioned previously, including long-term considerations. The approach proposed
consists of a framework that integrates climate change models in order to assess present and future
risks of exposure of spent fuel in the case of flooding of the storing facility. Moreover, thanks also
to the BN approach, the model proposed is extremely flexible and can easily be improved when
more information is available. Indeed, as shown in the sections later in this paper that describe the
sea-wave overtopping event, each node can be expanded, relying on the use of dedicated models
and increasing the accuracy of the overall analysis. Finally, as shown in the case study application,
the results can be analysed from various points of view, evaluating the risks of several accident
scenarios with regard to different time periods. This makes the tool highly attractive for both long-
term and real-time risk analysis. In the following section, the theoretical background of BNs is
provided. Thereafter, a general model dedicated to the quantification of the risk of exposure of
spent nuclear fuel subject to flooding hazard is presented. Next, the application of the model to the
case study of the Sizewell B nuclear power station is described. Finally, the results of the study and
remarks regarding the advantages and limitations of the adopted approach are widely discussed.
2 Bayesian Networks
BNs, also known as belief networks, are statistical models based on the use of directed acyclic
graphs for the representation of probability distributions. They provide the factorization of the
joint probability distribution associated with an event of interest, exploiting information about the
conditional dependencies existing among the variables. This approach relies on a double nature
graphically represented by the structure of the network itself, to which quantitative values are
associated throughout the introduction of conditional probability distributions. The structure of
a BN consists of a variable number of nodes, each of which represents a random variable of the
problem being modelled. The variables should be interpreted in Bayesian terms, or they can have
different origins: for instance, they may be observable quantities, unknown parameters, or even
mere hypotheses. The nodes of a BN are connected by edges (commonly represented as arrows)
expressing informal or causal dependencies existing among the variables. Only nodes that have
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some sort of dependency are linked, while those that are not joined refer to variables that are
conditionally independent of each other. The edges are characterized by directions that are coherent
with the causal relationship of the variables connected. With regard to the BN introduced in Fig.1,
the node X1 is called the parent of X2 and X3, which are also referred to as its children. Nodes
that have no parents are defined as the roots of the network. Generally, on the basis of the Bayes’s
theorem, the joint probability modelled by any BN with nodes X1, X2, ..., Xn can be expressed as:
P (X1, ..., Xn) =
∏
i
p (Xi | pa(Xi)) (1)
where pa(Xi) refers to the outcomes assumed by the parents of the node Xi. Then, the joint
probability associated with the BN of Fig.1, where all nodes have been assumed boolean only for
simplicity purposes (i.e. Xi = {x1i , x2i }, i = 1, 2, 3), is:
P (X1, X2, X3) = p (X1) p (X2|X1) p (X3|X1) (2)
In a BN, each node is conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its parent variables,
satisfying the local Markov property [60]. The strength of the dependencies associated with each
cluster of parent-child nodes is represented by the conditional probabilities mentioned. These can
be of different natures according to the structure of the variables concerned. BNs also allow the
updating of the marginal probabilities of the variables involved on the basis of new information
that might become available. This way, introducing evidence in the model, it is possible to anal-
yse "what if" scenarios, as well as the propagation of the information in the direction of interest.
Software packages have been developed that allow the adoption of several algorithms, both exact
and approximate, for the computation of inference in BNs. Murphy [49] presents a review of the
software packages that are available.
The choice of one approach or the other entails both advantages and disadvantages. Exact infer-
ence algorithms (e.g., the junction tree algorithm) are robust and well established in the scientific
literature but they restrict the use of probability distributions to the discrete field with the sole ex-
ception of Gaussian distributions. In most cases, this implies the necessity to discretize continuous
random variables, reducing the quality of the information. On the other hand, the approximate
approach allows one to perform the inference on continuous nodes using simulation techniques
(e.g., Markov-chain Monte Carlo methods) but it can be either computationally inefficient or have
unknown rates of convergence. A complete overview of BNs is provided by Pearl and Russell [55].
Although the establishment of BNs as a field of study and their definition as a complete statistical
approach date back to the early 1980s [54], their development has been bound for several years
by limitations related to the lack of reliable algorithms and the computational power to compute
inference. Conversely, thanks to their unique peculiarities and rapid technological progress in the
last several decades, BNs have attracted ever-increasing interest from people in different scientific
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areas. For instance, Weber et al.[70] presented a bibliography review of BN applications in differ-
ent sectors of applied sciences. The study highlights the increasing use of BNs as a tool for risk
analysis: between 2001 and 2008, the number of references per year increased by a factor of 4.
Former studies demonstrate the capabilities of BNs in risk analysis in terms of both the assessment
of low-probability events [28] and the modelling of complex systems [34]. Also, the potential of
BNs to integrate models and information of different natures, such as human factors, has attracted
increasing interest in the literature [11][37].
Finally, limited research proves the great potential of the BN approach in the estimation of natural
hazards [64][7].
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Figure 2: Overview of the BN model proposed for the risk assessment of spent nuclear fuel ponds
subject to the risk of flooding
3 Description of the Proposed Model
The purpose of the model implemented in this work is to quantify the risk of exposure of the spent
nuclear fuel stored in a fuel pond subject to the threat of flooding events, also taking into account
the consequences of eventual human error. The network is a general model that can be adopted
to compute the vulnerability of any system that is coherent with the hypothesis introduced and
described later in this paper. Moreover, given the high adaptability of the model, it can be easily
modified to meet the features of facilities differing from the target considered here.
The study focuses only on the flooding hazards, while other sources of risk, such as earthquakes or
extreme winds, fall outside the model’s area of application. The target chosen is a generic nuclear
power station located in a coastal area where the risk of significant tsunamis is generally negligible
[33]. Nevertheless, the facility is assumed to be protected by sea defences (such as embankment
seawalls commonly provided in rural areas) that are subject to the risk of failure in the case of
extreme sea conditions [38].
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In this study, the contributions of wave overtopping of coastal defences, together with that of heavy
rainfall, are considered the main sources of flooding hazard within the station perimeter. The spent
fuel management strategy considered for the target facility consists of underwater storage of the
fuel rods in a dedicated pond. These are large robust monolithic structures where fuel assemblies
are stored in racks that provide spacing for coolant flow: the pools are filled with several additional
meters of water above the spent fuel to provide biological shielding [1]. The facility is assumed
to be provided with basic equipment such as a drainage system (with a discharge point of the
waste stream into the sea; see node Outfall in Fig.2), an on-site electric power substation (to ensure
the connection to the national grid), emergency diesels (EmergencyPowerSupplies), emergency
hydrants (to make up for the loss of water due to evaporation in the case of failure of the cooling
system), and a spent fuel pond cooling system, whose correct functioning is assumed to be bound
by the availability of alternating current (AC) power [1].
It is expected that the floods will affect the plant’s main and auxiliary supplies (crucial for the
correct functioning of the pond), as well as the emergency measures planned to face eventual
breakdowns [18]. These can fail due to the unavailability of resources or lack of effective actions
due to human error. In this case, the operators who would be supposed to take measures to limit
the damages caused by the failure (for instance, manually refilling the pond to ensure the coverage
of the fuel) do not act as planned, leading to the same consequences of technical failure (such as
the unavailability of reservoirs or emergency hydrants).
The BN proposed (shown in Fig.2) consists of 37 nodes. For the sake of clarity, the description
of the model proposed next is organized into three sections, according to the aim of as many
different subsets of the network. Since each node of the network is designed to represent a specific
event, if not specified otherwise, the terms defining each node and the related event are considered
interchangeable from then on.
3.1 Natural-technological interaction section
The upper part of the network (Fig.3) aims to model the direct effects of natural events on the
nuclear facility and its surroundings. This section discusses nodes either related to weather con-
SeaWavePeriod SeaWaveHeight
TimeScenario
ExtremePrecipitation
DrainageSystem
ExtremeSeaWaterLevel
WaveOvertoppingFloodingSurroundings Outfall
FloodingStationArea
Figure 3: Section of the network modelling the direct effects of natural events
ditions (ExtremePrecipitation, SeaWaterLevel, SeaWavePeriod, SeaWaveHeight) or representing
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failures directly triggered by the natural event (DrainageSystem, FloodingSurroundings, Outfall,
WaveOvertopping). Behind the causal links that connect these two series of variables lie three main
mechanisms of external flooding:
• River flooding. This contribution is assumed to have the potential to affect the surroundings
of the facility, and it is mainly represented by the interaction between ExtremePrecipitation
and FloodingSurroundings: an extreme amount of rainfall can lead local water courses to
burst their banks, spilling water into the floodplain. Existent models based on local data can
be easily adopted to define the causal relationships between the two variables.
• Surface water flooding. It presupposes the impossibility of discharging water from the fa-
cility area, causing rainwater to lie or flow over the ground instead of draining away. This
can occur as a result of failure of the DrainageSystem, due to exceptionally heavy rainfall
(ExtremePrecipitation), or from the unavailability of the Outfall due to extreme sea levels
(ExtremeSeaWaterLevel).
• Coastal flooding. It concerns both tidal flooding and sea-wave overtopping of coastal de-
fences. Tidal flooding occurs when low-lying ground is flooded by the sea as a result of the
extreme height of the tidal cycle (regardless wave conditions): since nuclear facilities are
located at elevations tailored for tide and surge levels [4] this type of contribution is assumed
to affect only the surrounding area (FloodingSurroundings). In light of this, the quantifica-
tion of the risk of coastal flooding for the facility mainly implies modelling the mechanism
of discharge of seawater within the station perimeter due to the action of sea waves. This has
been realized by integrating the contribution of sea-wave overtopping in the (FloodingSta-
tionArea) mechanism. The event (WaveOvertopping) results from extreme sea conditions,
which are ExtremeSeaWaterLevel generally, due to the combination of high tide and surges;
and SeaWaveHeight and SeaWavePeriod, which under adverse weather conditions can as-
sume severe proportions.
High water levels, represented in the model by the node ExtremeSeaWaterLevel, result from the
interaction of tides and storm surges. While the first are originated by astronomical movements,
the storm surge consists of a meteorologically driven component of water level generated by syn-
optic variations of atmospheric pressure and wind [72]. This, therefore, leads to a certain relation
between the surge component and the heights of sea waves generated by wind: larger storm surges
are expected to correspond to greater values of wind speed. Nevertheless, the correlation results
are relatively weak, considering that in a sea level record, the non-correlated tide dominates, with
the astronomic tide typically 97-98% of the total sea level, and rarely less than 80-85% of the total
sea level even during the most extreme events [27]. Hence, as it is only the surge contribution
that is likely to be physically associated with extreme wave height under the same meteorological
conditions, the assumption of independence between the nodes ExtremeSeaWaterLevel and Sea-
WaveHeight should not compromise the validity of the assessment. For similar reasons, a certain
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correlation is expected to exist between ExtremePrecipitation and ExtremeSeaWaterLevel as well.
Several studies found that the dependence between extreme rainfall and storm surge is statistically
significant and needed to be taken into account for flood risk estimation, although spatial variability
of the dependence strength was observed [66]. In this case, though, the consideration of general sea
level (in most cases dominated by astronomical tide) leads to weaker dependence values compared
to the adoption of storm surge estimates; furthermore, little is known about the factors behind such
dependence, nor of the degree of variability of dependence strength over a large geographic area
[73].
In the absence of a direct causal relation between the variables, it is not possible to represent the
correlation in the network; nevertheless, this limitation of the method is mitigated by the weak-
ness of the correlation values among the variables involved, which is expected to have a negligible
influence on the overall result of the analysis. The overall combination of the flooding dynamics
considered can lead to the accumulation of water within the perimeter of the facility, event rep-
resented by the node FloodingStationArea. No internal failures (such as the damage of pipes or
reservoirs) are taken into account as sources of flooding in the model. This part of the network
also embraces improperly causal relations: the node TimeScenario, as the name suggests, allows
analysis to run with regard to a particular time interval of choice. Introducing evidence in the node,
hence selecting the time scenario of interest, it is possible to take into account the influence of cli-
mate change on natural events. As Fig.2 shows, climate change forecasts are considered in terms of
sea level rise (represented by the edge pointing to the ExtremeWaterLevel node) and intensification
of precipitations. Also, extreme wave conditions depend on the time period considered: previous
studies [40] have shown that climate change may have a significant impact on sea-wave character-
istics, even if considerable variation in projections can arise from the different climate models and
scenarios used to force wave models, which reduces the confidence in the projections already low-
ered by the small number of studies, lack of consistency of the wind projections between models,
and limitations in their ability to simulate extreme winds [61].
3.2 Internal failure section
According to the BN model proposed, the event of exposure of the spent nuclear fuel is bound
by the availability of either cooling systems or emergency supplies. Only if both these subsys-
tems are out of order is the SpentFuelExposure event (Fig.4) assumed to occur. As mentioned
previously, the cooling system is expected to fail if no electric power, either generated on site
(OnSiteAC) or supplied to the station from the external grid (OffSiteAC), is available. Hence, sta-
tion blackouts are considered as the main safety issue for the correct functioning of the spent fuel
pool, since many safety systems required for heat removal depend on AC power [5]. The failure
of on-site generation can be attributed to power station outages, whether planned (e.g., refuelling
or decommissioning) or unplanned (e.g., emergency reactor shut-down); the failure of emergency
power supplies (EmergencyPowerSupplies) is also a precursor of station blackouts. Indeed, nuclear
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Figure 4: Section of the network modelling internal failures
power plants worldwide have a configuration of emergency power supply systems (typically emer-
gency diesel generators) that include at least two redundant trains of safety buses, each powered
by an emergency diesel generator that replaces the regular power supply or off-site power should it
become unavailable [32]. Coherently, the failure of EmergencyPowerSupplies is assumed to lead
to a station blackout in case of loss of OffSiteAC. If both the outage and the failure of emergency
diesels occur, no power generation is assumed to be available on site.
Normally, the interface between the plant’s main generator and the electrical grid is formed by the
OnSiteSubstation, which provides reliable off-site power for the nuclear station under all operating
and shut-down conditions. For example, if power generation is interrupted, the power supply au-
tomatically transfers to the off-site grid. If that is not supplying suitable power (e.g., unacceptable
voltage), the buses are reenergized by fast-starting emergency diesel generators [41]. In light of
this, the failure of the on-site electric substations and connections (OnSiteSubstation) can cause
loss of power from the external network. This can also be triggered by a generic loss of external
power grid, in which case the nuclear plants involved in the blackout are required to shut down
safely (UnplannedOutage), according to procedures [43]. Failure of the emergency power supplies
would seriously hinder the ability of the plant operators to carry out the required safety functions
[41]. This is taken into account in the model by the node EmergencySupplies, which refers to the
lack of effective actions on the pond in the case of unavailability of the cooling system. This kind
of intervention involves both technological and human aspects: spent fuel ponds are provided with
a source of high-purity water (generally the refuelling water storage tank for pressurized water re-
actors and the condensate storage tank for boiling water reactors) to make up for the loss of water
due to evaporation in the case of cooling system loss. Plants also have alternative methods to pro-
vide make-up if normal make-up is unavailable, and may include the service water system and the
fire water system, which can require the intervention of operators [1]. The possible loss of water
inventory is taken into account in the model through the node Reservoirs, while the possible failure
of the fire water system is represented by the node EmergencyHydrantSystem. The occurrence of
human error (HumanError) is considered to nullify or prevent the action leading to a lack of inter-
vention by the operator, with consequences similar to that of a EmergencyHydrantSystem failure.
The large volume of water in the pond ensures a significant thermal inertia, generally slowing any
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accident progression and giving respite for actions from the outside (e.g., use of fire tenders). Only
if this intervention fails as well (DelayInReaction) is the failure of EmergencySupplies assumed to
occur.
This section of the network is connected to the overall model through four nodes: FloodingSur-
roundings, FloodingStationArea, TimeScenario, and HumanError. The first two belong to the
upper part of the network previously discussed and affect the system in similar ways: flooding near
the station has the potential to affect the only road of access, and then to make the rescue from the
outside impossible; likewise, the accumulation of water inside the facility can affect a wide range
of other subsystems, such as emergency supplies or electric transformers. Also the node TimeSce-
nario belongs to the first section but, as mentioned before, it does not represent a proper event since
the links that it shares with other nodes have no causal meaning. The connection between this node
and PlannedOutage aims to take into account the possible decommissioning of the nuclear power
plant in future scenarios.
Finally, the HumanError event refers to the lack of action by the operators and is modelled accord-
ing to Groth and Mosleh [25] by a third part of the overall network, described next.
3.3 Human Error section
From the evaluation of past events and accident scenarios involving spent fuel pools, human error
has been reported as one of the most common root causes [1]. Even if none of the reported events
resulted in severe accidents (many of them had only negligible consequences on the spent fuel),
this highlights the importance of including operator performance in the analysis. Although several
methodologies for human reliability analysis have been proposed in the literature, none of them
has ever reached a general consensus.
Commonly, human error has been modelled on the basis of probabilistic concepts, assuming all
probabilities to be precise [59]. Nevertheless, the probabilistic approach has shown a limitation on
the quantification of qualitative aspects of human error and the complexity of attributes from the cir-
cumstances involved, leading to investigate methodologies based on a fuzzy logic approach, which
is expected to better represent the human interacting system’s reliability [35]. However, research
in this direction is still limited with regard to applications to the nuclear industry [15]. More tradi-
tional and common approaches are based on the use of precise numerical factors aiming to capture
the influence of given specific working conditions or task situations on human activities. For in-
stance, performance-influencing factors (PIFs) are largely used as causes or contributors to unsafe
human actions in event analysis to predict human behaviour and cognitive processes [36]. A BN
approach to human reliability represents a good compromise approach to integrating limited data
and expert judgement without losing the robustness of well-known and largely used approaches
[25]. In this study, the BN model proposed by Groth and Mosleh [25] to quantify the probability
of human error in case of significant incidents at a nuclear power plant has been integrated into
the overall framework. The approach suggested in the study and shown in Fig.5 integrates PIFs
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and their interdependencies in a BN framework. Nine of the nodes belonging to this section (Re-
sources, OrganizationalCulture, Knowledge, Team, Training, Complexity, Machine, Attitude, and
LoadsAndPerceptions) refer to as many groups of PIFs, while the four ErrorContext nodes aim
to capture the interrelation among different factors and correlations among nodes not linked by
direct causal relationships. Each of these four nodes acts as a precursor of the HumanError event,
to which all of them contribute with different weights. For further details regarding the approach
refer to Groth and Mosleh [25].
This part of the network is linked to the rest of the model through the causal dependency between
the nodes HumanError and EmergencySupplies, as argued in the previous section. An accurate
approach should take into account other aspects, such as the consequences of flooding on the avail-
ability of suitable tools (Resources) or the effect of downsizing (in the case of decommissioning)
on the work team (Team). However data limitations preclude this kind of development of the model
for now. Further study in this direction is strongly advisable but beyond the scope of this work.
OrganizationalCulture
MachineTeam Training
Resources
Complexity
ErrorContext4
Knowledge
Attitude
LoadsAndPerceptions
ErrorContext1 ErrorContext3 ErrorContext2
HumanError
Figure 5: Section of the network modelling human failures
4 A case study: Sizewell B nuclear power station
The nuclear power plant of Sizewell B (Fig.6) in East Anglia, United Kingdom, operated by EDF
Energy, has been selected as a real-world case study for the application of the proposed BN model.
There are several reasons behind the choice of this station: first, the location is particularly in-
teresting since, according to the flood maps provided by the U.K. Environment Agency [2], the
surrounding area is subject to risk of flooding. Next, EDF’s strategic target is to extend the oper-
ational life of the installation, postponing the decommissioning date from 2035 to 2055 [30]; it is
then of particular interest to evaluate the impact of climate change on the risks to which the facility
is subject.
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Figure 6: Simplified layout of the Sizewell nuclear site with reactor building (1), fuel building (2),
and dry fuel cask (3); at the east of the site are located the so-called Bent Hills (4), and to the west
the Sizewell A power station (5)
Moreover, unlike British Magnox and advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) stations, in which the
spent fuel is located on site only for short periods and then transferred to the reprocessing facility
of Sellafield, the management strategy adopted for Sizewell B involves long-term on-site storage
under water [22]. Furthermore, the current rate of accumulation and current safety restrictions
suggest that full capacity of the on-site pond will be reached by 2015. Finally, the construction of a
new dry fuel storage system (started in January 2013 to guarantee further capacity) and the aim to
build a new power plant located on land next to the current Sizewell B station make this case study
more attractive in view of further developments and applications. This section aims to provide
an overall description of the facility under study, as well as of the related numerical implementa-
tion. Finally, the results obtained by the inference computation on the network are introduced and
analysed.
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4.1 Description of the facility
The Sizewell B power plant is built on a plateau 6.4 m above ordnance datum (AOD) on the coast
of East Anglia in the county of Suffolk. It shares a site of 97 ha with the Sizewell A station (which
is no longer operating) on the southern side. The area to the east of the station consists of a series
of sand dunes that gradually slope down to the seashore, covering a width of approximately 100 m.
These ridges, commonly known as the Bent Hills, have been remodelled to provide a 10-m-high
sea defence embankment along the east boundary of the site. The land surrounding the station to
the north and west is swampy and subject to the risk of flooding. Nevertheless, due to the major
elevation of the nuclear island with respect to its surroundings, floods in this area are not expected
to represent a direct hazard to the station. The site access road is located at an elevation of 3.5 m
AOD.
Built between 1988 and 1995, the power plant includes two main turbine generators and a single
reactor based on a Westinghouse standard, four-loop, pressurized water design. The initial design
was modified, mainly in terms of capacity and redundancy of safety system, in order to fulfil U.K.
requirements. The station supplies to the national grid 1,198MW, approximately equal to 3% of the
United Kingdom’s power needs. The on-site electric substation is connected to the external grid at
three separate 400 kV points (two at Bramford, one at Norwich, and one at Pelham) and provides
a connection with the external network for the import and export of power.
Adjacent to the reactor building, the fuel building accommodates the pond, where both new and
used fuel are stored underwater [6]. The pool consists of a stainless steel–lined reinforced cavity
where the fuel assemblies are located at a depth of water adequate to guarantee the coverage of
the fuel for 24 h in case of total loss of the cooling system. The latter consists of a primary
ultimate heat-sink (seawater) and a reserve ultimate heat-sink (air-cooling system), which ensure
the thermal exchange required for the pumped flow. The availability of AC power on site binds the
working order of the cooling system in the fuel facility. All the buildings on the nuclear island are
provided with fire doors that can act as flood barriers up to a water depth of 1 m [20]. According
to a report by Magnox [42], a reservoir with a maximum water level of 13.9 m AOD and an invert
level of 6.9 m AOD is located on site.
4.2 Numerical Implementation
The inference on the network for the Sizewell B application has been computed using the Bayes
net toolbox for MATLAB [48][45] and adopting the well-known junction tree inference algorithm.
As previously mentioned, the use of exact inference methods (such as the junction tree algorithm)
can lead to the impoverishment of the information available due to the need of discretization and, in
some cases, can affect the congruence of the result. As already highlighted for a previous version
of the model [67], the limitations discussed for this application have faced a particular significance
with regard to the modelling of the sea-wave overtopping mechanism. In light of this, the approach
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suggested by Straub and Kiureghian [65] was applied to a small subset of the section (namely, the
nodes SeaWavePeriod, SeaWaveHeight, ExtremeSeaWaterLevel, WaveOvertopping) in order to be
able to take continuous distributions into account without abandoning exact inference methods.
This is possible thanks to the use of structural reliability theory to enhance BN models. Indeed, the
approach allows the computing of relations among continuous variables, reducing the inference
problem to that of a traditional BN without losing information or accuracy.
The numerical implementation of the case study introduced in this part of the discussion is or-
ganized into three subsections: the first two refer to the natural-technological interaction section
(or top section), addressing the computation of the WaveOvertopping node briefly introduced here
and the data source of the climate change scenarios embraced. The last section is dedicated to the
description of the bottom part of the network, providing details about the inputs adopted for the
internal failure section. The human error section of the model is not discussed here since, in the
absence of additional data, the numerical values provided by Groth and Mosleh [25] have been
introduced without further updating. Please refer to the original study for more details about the
numerical values adopted in the implementation.
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Figure 7: Scheme of the sea-wave overtopping mechanism; CL refers to the crest level of the
seawall; SWL the still-water level; and Q the overtopping rate
Top section: wave overtopping of sea defences As shown in Figs. 2 and 3, the WaveOvertop-
ping node has three parents: ExtremeSeaWaterLevel, SeaWavePeriod, and SeaWaveHeight. The
return values related to the first of the three events for the coast of Sizewell have been provided
by U.K. Environment Agency [3] and updated using the sea level rise projections specified in the
next subsection. On the contrary, no probability values or model for SeaWavePeriod and Sea-
WaveHeight are available in the existing scientific literature: inputs for these two nodes have been
computed starting from historical records provided by CEFAS [23]. The available data have been
recorded using a directional waverider buoy located off the coast of Sizewell and moored at a water
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Figure 8: Scatter diagram of significant wave height and peak wave period data
depth of 18 m. Records cover a time interval of more than six years (from February 2008 to August
2014) for a total of almost 90,000 valid measurements. The data refer to the significant wave height
(mean wave height of the highest third of the waves recorded) and wave peak period (wave period
corresponding to the peak of the incident wave spectrum) and are shown in the scatter diagram
shown in Fig.8. It has been fitted into generalized extreme value probability distributions (Fig.9
for the related wave significant height statistical model) using the maximum-likelihood estimation
method [see Appendix]. The optimized values obtained for the parameters of the significant wave
height and peak period probability distributions are presented in Table 1. The adoption of this
type of distribution is justified by the need of predicting return values for extreme wave conditions
and then to extrapolate well beyond the range of the available hindcasts [10]. As is possible to
see in Fig.9 with regard to the significant wave height data, a minimal loss of accuracy in the first
part of the domain is balanced by a good representation of the measurement trend in the region of
maximum interest for this study, which means the right side of the wave height domain to which
corresponds a higher risk of overtopping.
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Figure 9: Generalized extreme value model of the wave significant height probability distribution
As opposed to its parents, neither discrete probability values nor historical data are available for the
event WaveOvertopping; hence, the conditional probability values of the node must be computed
by means of mathematical models.
The WaveOvertopping event is assumed to occur when the amount of seawater overcoming the sea
defence exceeds the admissible wave overtopping rate (equal to 0.0466 m3/s per unit length of
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Table 1: Parameters of Generalized Extreme Value Distributions Computed with Maximum Like-
lihood Estimation
Parameter WaveHeight WavePeriod
Shape Parameter 0.26803 0.00513
Scale Parameter 0.28039 1.45702
Location Parameter 0.53984 4.62444
the seawall for this application), according to the mechanism shown in Fig.7. According to the
probabilistic model suggested by Hedges et al. [29], waves overcome the sea defences when the
following condition is verified:
0 ≤ (CL− SWL)
rCHs
< 1 (3)
where CL = crest level of the seawall; SWL = still-water level (average water surface elevation at
any instant including the effect of tides, storm surges, and long-period seiches); r = seawall slope
roughness;Hs = significant wave height; andC = ratio of the maximum run-up [maximum vertical
extent of wave uprush on a beach or structure above the still-water level [62]] to the significant
height of the incident waves and can be expressed as a function of the surf similarity parameter ξp,
given by the equation:
ξp =
tan(α)√
2piHs/gT 2p
(4)
where Tp = peak wave period. Hence, for given seawall features, such as the slope roughness and
inclination (α), the probability of excedance of the admissible wave overtopping rate Q can be
computed as P (Z ≤ 0) where Z is expressed, according to Hedges and Reis, as
Z = Q−A
√
g(CHs)3
[
1− CL− SWL
r (CHs)
]eBB
(5)
where g refers to the gravitational acceleration, A and B to empirical coefficients of the model
dependent on the inclination of the seawall [58] and eB to a a parameter that represents the scatter
about the line of perfect agreement between the predicted and measured values of the mean dis-
charge.
It is clear that discretizing the WavePeriod and WaveOvertopping nodes would affect the credibility
of the analysis and the effectiveness of the model adopted to compute the conditional probabilities
of the event WaveOvertopping. Moreover, as it is possible to see from the scatter diagram in Fig.8
and the graphs in Fig.10, the two series of data related to the peak wave period and significant
wave height are correlated to each other. To ignore such a correlation would result in the loss of
physical significance of the model, including in the analysis pairs of values for Tp and Hs incom-
patible with the natural limits associated to wave conditions (e.g., very high significant heights and
very low peak period, or areas of the domain with no records available, as shown in Fig.10). The
28
0 1 2 3 4 5
Hm0
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
Tp [s]
H
m
0 
[m
]
5
10
15
20
Tp
 [s
]
 
 
Figure 10: Analysis of the correlation between significant wave height(Hm0) and peak period(Tp)
adoption of a structural reliability approach to compute the input of the WaveOvertopping node
is the solution chosen in this study to overcome these issues: it allows exploitation of all the ac-
cessible information (then avoiding the discretization of the continuous distributions), as well as
using linear factors to represent the correlation among variables, which are hardly characterizable
otherwise. On the other hand, this procedure excludes the SeaWavePeriod and SeaWaveHeight
nodes from the original BN and then from the inference computation: the results of the analysis
are stored in the WaveOvertopping node, whose conditional probabilities are updated according to
the results. To calculate the conditional probability of exceedance of admissible wave overtopping
rate (WaveOvertopping), given the state of the seawater level, requires as many analyses as many
are the possible states of the node ExtremeSeaWaterLevel. Hence, the result of each analysis cor-
responds to the probability of wave overtopping in the case in which the seawater level falls in a
particular interval of values according to the outcome states of the node ExtremeSeaWaterLevel.
The probabilities estimated this way were then introduced in the new conditional probability table
of the node WaveOvertopping, which in the reduced BN obtained through this approach has Ex-
tremeSeaWaterLevel as the only parent node.
The reliability analysis based on the probabilistic model of Hedges et al. [29] described above
has been performed using Monte Carlo simulations in the general-purpose software OpenCossan
OpenCossan [53]. In the implementation of the model, all the waves have been considered nor-
mally incident to the seawall and no integration with offshore, near-shore wave transformation
models has been considered, resulting in a strongly conservative approach. Conversely from what
suggested for the general model, no link has been considered between TimeScenario and the wave
condition nodes. Indeed, previous studies on the impact of sea level rise and climate change on
wave climate along the coast of East Anglia [12] have shown that the climate change scenario se-
lected leads to a significant increase of extreme wave heights only in the northern part of the region
but has only very little impact on the southern domain of the study, which interests the Sizewell
area (e.g., projected change for the 50-year return significant wave height in the region are be-
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tween 0 and -0.1 m, referring to the period between 2069 and 2099). Moreover, the same study
found offshore extremes (considered in this study) were not modified by sea level rise, which was
insignificant compared to the offshore water depths. Simplified assumptions have been made on
the composite seawall of the station, which has been considered as an equivalent uniform, smooth,
and impermeable slope. Moreover, as suggested by Hedges et al. [29], the inclination of the sea-
wall has been considered as normally distributed with mean 0.05 (corresponding to an inclination
of 1:20) and standard deviation of 0.1. The generalized extreme value distributions described in
Table 1 have been adopted for the peak wave period and significant wave height. In order to avoid
unrealistically wave conditions, a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.29 (represented by the con-
tinuous line in Fig.10) between the two variables has been computed from the respective series of
measurements available. This linear factor accounts for the fact that higher waves tend to have
longer periods, as shown by the data. The results of the reliability analysis are shown in Table 2.
As foreseeable, the conditional probability associated to the node WaveOvertopping grows along
with the seawater level.
Table 2: Conditional Probability of Exceedance of the Overtopping Admissible Rate Given Differ-
ent Values of Seawater Level
Sea Water Level WaveOvertopping
Over 5 m Above Ordnance Datum 3.262 · 10−04
Below 5 m Above Ordnance Datum 4.910 · 10−05
4.2.1 Top section: climate change scenarios
The TimeScenario node contemplates multiple outcome states, allowing three different time sce-
narios to be taken into consideration: the first related to the current conditions, the second to those
estimated for the year 2055, assuming that the station is still in operational order. Finally, the third
scenario involves the presence of spent fuel stored and the production of electric power on site is
limited to emergency diesels. The assumptions related to the three time scenarios are summarized
in Table 3. All the predictions related to climate change and adopted in the case study refer to
Table 3: Characterization of the Time Scenarios Adopted in This Study
Year of Reference Station State
Scenario 1 2015 Operational
Scenario 2 2055 Operational
Scenario 3 2099 Closed
a medium-emission scenario called SRES A1B, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change classification. The greenhouse gas emission forecasts associated with this scenario
are based on the assumption of a future world with very rapid economic growth, a global pop-
ulation that peaks in midcentury and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and
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more efficient technologies inspired by the balanced use of fossil and non-fossil energy sources
[51]. Projections [46] associated with this background have been adopted to update the extreme
seawater level return period values provided by the Environment Agency. As shown in Fig.11, the
results show the effect of sea level rise on the return values of the seawater level, which is expected
to increase of 0.301 m in 2055 and 0.659 m in 2099, in light of the emission scenario embraced.
Regarding the quantification of risk for extreme precipitation events, return period values from
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Figure 11: Return period curves for extreme sea water level
previous studies have been adopted [24]. Also, in this case, it is possible to note the growth in
frequency and intensity of the extreme precipitation events, along with the three time scenarios of
reference. Moreover, as shown in Fig.12 as well as by the results in Table 4, the difference be-
tween the precipitation amount in the three scenarios tends to grow for higher return periods, going
from 31 mm/d of difference between Scenarios 1 and 3 for the 500-year return period to 44 mm/d
for the 1,500-year return period. The state of the ExtremePrecipitation node directly determines
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Figure 12: Return period curves of daily extreme precipitation for the three scenarios considered
the outcome of DrainageSystem, which is assumed to fail when the design basis of 200 mm/d is
overcome. Similarly, the failure of the outfall, as well as the flooding of the area surrounding the
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Table 4: Extreme Precipitation Return Periods for the Three Time Scenarios Considered
Return Period Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
500 y 154 mm/d 171 mm/d 185 mm/d
1000 y 198 mm/d 226 mm/d 237 mm/d
1500 y 224 mm/d 247 mm/d 268 mm/d
station, are supposed to occur when the still-water level is higher than 5 m AOD. In this case, the
seawater is expected to overcome the coastal embankment impeding the use of the access road
(located at 3.5 m AOD). Finally the FloodingInTheStationArea event is assumed to occur when the
depth of water accumulated in the nuclear island (neglecting the topological set-up of the area) is
equal to or higher than 1.15 m, design basis for the fire barriers, which are expected to act as flood
barriers up to that value.
4.2.2 Bottom section
Unlike the upper part of the network, the conditional probabilities of the internal failure section
are quite homogeneous in terms of sources of data. The majority of them, indeed, have been
collected from the scientific literature available. The probability of failure for the node Emergen-
cyPowerSupplies is assumed to equal 1 when the station is flooded and 3 · 10−09(combination of
the failure probabilities of the four emergency diesels) otherwise [19]. The four engines have been
considered independent because each of the four trains is capable of supplying its selected loads
independent of the other three systems [20]. Likewise, the probability of failure of the external
grid (ExternalPowerGrid) has been calculated as the product of the failure rates of the three off-
site substations to which the power plant is connected [50]. Also, in this case, independence has
been assumed and the hypothesis justified by the geographical distance of the three sites [20]. The
rate of planned and unplanned outages has been calculated on the basis of the refuelling schedule
and the frequency of past events, both derived from EDF documentation [21]. Also, the failure rate
of emergency hydrant systems has been collected from previous research [31]. Table 5 shows the
references related to the nodes of the bottom section for which the probability values have been
collected or derived from the available literature.
Table 5: References for the Input of Bottom Section Nodes Deduced from Previous Scientific
Research
Node Reference
ExternalPowerGrid [50]
EmergencyHydrantSystem [31]
OnSiteSubstation [50]
PlannedOutage [21]
UnplannedOutage [21]
EmergencyPowerSupplies [19]
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Figure 13: Most probable explanation for the SpentFuelExposure. The orange color refers to the
occurrence of the events highlighted
The state of the remaining events involved in the bottom part of the network is considered to be
directly inferable from the outcomes of their precursor nodes: SpentFuelExposure is assumed to
occur when both the CoolingSystem and the EmergencyPowerSupplies are out of order. Similarly,
the failure of the latter happens if the operator does not intervene appropriately (HumanError) or if
EmergencyHydrantSystem is not available. Finally, the CoolingSystem failure is caused by station
blackouts (i.e., the unavailability of both OffSiteAC and OnSiteAC). Due to lack of information, the
presence of reservoirs in the station has been neglected, as well as the topological configuration of
the site. This latter assumption is expected to result in a conservative approach.
4.3 Results
According to the results, the risk of exposure of the spent fuel grows in time along with the three
scenarios considered, as foreseeable on the basis of the natural event intensification. In spite of this,
as can be seen in Table 6, the increase is slight, and in none of the time periods does the probability
of severe accidents assume significant values. Similarly, the marginal probability of flooding in the
station area, as well as the probability of failure of the cooling system, show the same trend. The
probability of flooding in the surrounding area is more affected by climate change, as expected, but
it also always remains quite low in this case, within an order of magnitude of 10−5. In addition to
Table 6: Quantification of Risk for Several Events
Event Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
(2015) (2055) (2099)
On-site Flooding 1.239 · 10−10 2.483 · 10−10 3.448 · 10−10
Cooling System 1.411 · 10−10 2.655 · 10−10 3.620 · 10−10
Spent Fuel Exposure 2.592 · 10−16 2.804 · 10−15 2.695 · 10−14
Flooding in Surroundings 3.147 · 10−07 1.699 · 10−06 1.176 · 10−05
quantifying the risks of failure of the different subsystems for different climate scenarios, the model
allows one to consider the most probable explanation for the occurrence of SpentFuelExposure,
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introducing the evidence associated with the event. Indeed, as previously highlighted, BNs permit
the updating the marginal probabilities of each node on the basis of the evidence available. On the
basis of these revised values, it is possible to reconstruct the most likely sequence of events behind
the occurrence of the outcome of interest. Fig.13 shows such a path: the events highlighted have
the highest occurrence probability conditional to the exposure of the fuel.
4.3.1 What-if analysis
Looking at the problem from the opposite perspective, it is possible to estimate the conditional
probability of an event of interest as well. Several What if scenarios have been evaluated in order
to better understand the distribution of the risk within the model. As is shown in Table 7, in the case
of failure of the cooling system or of flooding inside the perimeter of the nuclear island, the risk of
exposure grows exponentially in all the analysed cases: these two events are the most significant
precursors for the failure of the spent fuel pond system. Other events, such as the flooding in the
surrounding area or the malfunctioning of the drainage system, can raise the overall risk of several
orders of magnitude. Conversely, the occurrence of human error does not have much impact on the
risk of exposure: also, in combination with other events, such as the failure of the drainage system,
its contribution is quite low. Nevertheless, it has to be remembered that this part of the modelling
is strongly affected by lack of data: the use of expert judgements to better identify the weight of
each error contexts could significantly modify the impact of human error on the overall accident
scenario. Likewise, introducing evidence regarding the correct functioning of various subsystems,
Table 7: Risk of Spent Fuel Exposure Conditional to Evidence of Correct Functioning of Subsys-
tems
Event Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
(2015) (2055) (2099)
Cooling System Failed 1.837 · 10−06 1.056 · 10−05 7.444 · 10−05
Station Flooded 2.090 · 10−06 1.129 · 10−05 7.813 · 10−05
Failure Drainage System 2.334 · 10−12 2.469 · 10−11 2.333 · 10−10
Surroundings Flooded 8.237 · 10−10 1.650 · 10−09 2.291 · 10−09
Human Error 2.645 · 10−16 2.832 · 10−15 2.714 · 10−14
Human Error &
Failure Drainage System 2.334 · 10−12 2.469 · 10−11 2.333 · 10−10
it is possible to notice the improved reliability of the overall system, as shown in Table 8. This
kind of analysis can become an extremely important support for decision making regarding the
eventual adoption of further actions to improve the robustness of the system. For example, in order
to evaluate the importance of events affecting the effectiveness of reaction in case of accidents,
the probability related to potential causes of this type of failure can be further analysed in order to
take the most effective action possible. The results in Table 9 show that, in case of flooding and
with regard to the current time scenario, the malfunctioning of the emergency hydrants is the most
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Table 8: Risk of Spent Fuel Exposure Conditional to Evidence on the Correct Functioning of
Subsystems
What if...? Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3
(2015) (2055) (2099)
Drainage System Operating 1.293 · 10−19 6.980 · 10−19 4.832 · 10−18
Surroundings Not Flooded 0 0 0
No Human Errors 2.592 · 10−16 2.804 · 10−15 2.695 · 10−14
probable explanation behind the lack of efficient reaction. In light of this, taking action to ensure
more auxiliary water supplies would further improve the reliability of the system, decreasing the
overall risk of exposure of the spent fuel dramatically.
Table 9: Probable Causes of Failure of Intervention (Emergency Supplies) in Case of Flooding
What if...? Scenario1
(2015)
Human Error 9.148 · 10−02
Failure Hydrant System 9.105 · 10−01
5 Discussion
The model proposed identifies three main types of interaction that can contribute to the overall
failure of the system: between natural hazards and the facility, between human operators and the
technological interface, and finally among the different components of the installation, which con-
stitute a complex internal network of dependencies. Each of these subsets of the overall problem
are modelled in view of their internal mechanisms of failure and then represented as the combina-
tion of elementary events connected to each other by causal links. This intuitive representation and
the flexibility of the approach adopted make the model particularly attractive for future upgrades
and improvements, and then potentially useful for more accurate real-world applications in the fu-
ture.
More generally, as shown by the case study discussed in this paper, BNs proved to be a valid instru-
ment for many aspects of Natech risk analysis: the integration of different models in the general
framework has been performed, data from very different sources have been adopted (from projec-
tions and experimental records to expert judgement), and the description of the complex system
has been carried out considering individual parts and their interactions, finally obtaining a coher-
ent framework that is easy to understand and accessible to non-experts. In addition, the ability to
perform inference (including very low probabilities) makes BNs suitable for the analysis of Natech
accidents and rare events. Finally, Bayesian updating and the prompt estimation of the risk associ-
ated with What if scenarios make this approach extremely attractive for real-time decision support.
On the other hand, two main drawbacks of this method have been identified with regard to this kind
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of application. First, the necessity to include natural events as variables of the inference problem
implies the need to adopt probabilistic models for their representation, in order to capture their
inner randomness and the aleatory uncertainty of data. On the contrary, the restriction to the use
of only discrete nodes, typical of traditional BN and exact inference, can strongly affect data and
undermine the credibility of the results. In addition, the assumption of independence between vari-
ables not connected by causal links can represent a strong limitation in the application of BNs to
natural hazard assessment: different meteorologically driven phenomena often show a more-or-
less significant degree of correlation that emerges from data but remains hardly explicable through
causal relationships, hence are impossible to represent with BNs. Second, a reliable tool for risk
assessment cannot avoid the epistemic uncertainty associated with the input. This is all the more
true when questionable data such as climate projections or expert judgements are involved. The
use of strongly uncertain data can lead to misleading results and, in the case of risk management, to
the adoption of ineffective, if not detrimental, actions. In other words, decision makers have to be
provided with information about the uncertainty affecting the results on which to base resolutions.
BNs lack this capability: also, in this case, it is necessary to overcome the restrictions related to
the use of discrete numerical values, adopting models that can capture the epistemic uncertainty of
the variables. The use of system reliability methods, as for the sea-wave overtopping model imple-
mented, appears to be a valid solution to include continuous variables and their correlation in the
BN framework. In light of this, future research will focus first on the implementation of automatic
algorithms to coherently integrate traditional system reliability methods with the BN methodology,
and then on extending this technique to more advanced methods that can capture the epistemic
uncertainty of data (e.g., adopting convex models and imprecise probabilities).
6 Conclusions
Features of BNs such as their inner flexibility and their capability to describe accurately dependen-
cies and causal events related to complex systems and to include data of different natures, make
them a promising tool in risk assessment applications. The current study aims to test the potential
of BNs in areas of particular significance for Natech events. It focused on the implementation of a
BN for the evaluation of the risk of exposure of spent nuclear fuel stored on site in a power plant
subject to flooding hazards. The model proposed addresses the increasing concerns, raised by the
public as well as the scientific community, regarding the safety of technological installations and
their vulnerability to extreme weather events, as well as the lack of suitable tools for the assess-
ment of the risks related to such hazards. The network includes the effect of climate change on
natural hazards to simulate their direct interaction with the facility and that of human error on the
resilience and response to internal failures. The application to a real-world case study (namely,
the nuclear power plant of Sizewell B) has been analysed, performing inference for three different
time scenarios (i.e., 2015, 2055, and 2099). The marginal probabilities of single events, as well as
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those associated with particular accident scenarios, have been computed, revealing a general trend
of the risk increasing with time. In spite of this, in none of the analysed accident scenarios did the
probability of exposure of the nuclear fuel or of other important precursor events reach significant
values. The results of the analysis indicate a good degree of robustness of the facility against cur-
rent and future external hazards.
Finally, the validity of BNs as a tool for risk assessment of complex systems is attested and their
limitations in this field identified. The combination of BNs with structural reliability methods is
found to be a suitable solution to overcome some of the BN limitations found in the study. Indeed,
it allows including continuous variables in the analysis, improving accuracy without sacrificing the
efficiency of exact-inference algorithms.
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